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Professor Hudec and the Appellate Body
Ricardo Ramirez*
GATT dispute settlement will probably always teeter on the edge of
crisis, for there will always be a tendency to use it to cover up substantive failures. I like to believe, however, that if GATT dispute settlement keeps its balance for another forty years, Governments may
end up creating an effective litigation procedure in spite of themselves.
Robert E. Hudec1

I. INTRODUCTION
I met Professor Hudec only once. September 1997. It was
during a NAFTA panel hearing in the broom corn brooms case.
He was a panelist in that case. In fact, he was chosen by Mexico
to serve in that dispute. According to the NAFTA’s “crossed selection” mechanism, a party to a dispute gets to choose panelists who are nationals of the other party.2 At that time, I was a
junior attorney in the office of the General Counsel at the Mexican Ministry of Economy, I had to do the research for panelists
selection among American trade lawyers. To be sincere, I don’t
remember very much of the result of that research. The only
thing I do remember was that one of the reasons behind Professor Hudec’s selection was his impeccable reputation as a fairminded person and as one of the founders of the American international trade law doctrine.
So, there I was in front of him, listening to his questioning
* Professor of international trade law at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de Mexico. Member, Appellate Body, 2009-2013. The views expressed in this
speech should not be interpreted as expressing a particular position taken by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the WTO Appellate Body. Moreover,
the views in this article should not be interpreted as endorsing or rejecting
any of Professor Robert E. Hudec views on any aspect of international trade
law. I wish to thank Alan Yanovich and Christian Vidal León for their helpful
comments.
1. Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on
the Nature of Litigation Between Governments 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 226
(1987).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 289,
605 (1993).
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and feeling somewhat overwhelmed by the whole scene. Bear in
mind that this was in fact the very first trade case handled by a
group of young and inexperienced Mexican attorneys. At that
time, GATT/WTO disputes were handled by the Mexican Mission in Geneva, so this was our very first trial and actually the
first time Mexico was participating in a NAFTA dispute.
Maybe this feeling was the reason which prevented me
from approaching him when that hearing ended. This was my
only chance and alas, turned out to be my last chance to have a
chat with him. This is why when Professor Shaffer very kindly
invited me to participate in this gathering, it gave me the perfect opportunity, since I was coming to his alma mater, to go
through his work again and pay a very humble tribute to a
great international trade law scholar.
As I reviewed his work, a lot of adjectives were used to describe him. Professor Davey called him “the role model of what
an academic should be”3; Professor Trachtman stated that he
was the “pioneering empiricist of international trade law”4; Professor Jackson called him a “consummate legal professional”5.
But the more I reflect on it, the more I come to the conclusion that the word that best describes him is “honest.” According to the Oxford shorter dictionary, honest means “free of deceit and untruthfulness; sincere”6. Professor Hudec was an
honest person. As far as I can tell, Professor Hudec did not believe in “mantras,” he had the honesty to accept or modify his
views according to the reality at hand or simply accept when
his ideas were wrong.
He always tried to find balance between diplomacy and the
rule of law. Between law and economy reality. This is evidenced
by the fact that his work continues to be an essential reference
in many topics. In this brief journey through Hudec’s work, I
will try to touch upon some of the key aspects of his international trade work.
II. AIM AND EFFECTS DOCTRINE
On substance, one has to start with his aim and effects test

3. John A. Jackson et. al., Tribute to Robert E. Hudec, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L.
729, 740 (2003).
4. Id. at 743.
5. Id. at 730.
6. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 1534 (5th ed. 2002).
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or doctrine with regard to the concept of “like product.”7 In my
view, the best example of Hudec’s thinking or approach towards the concept of like product is his description of actions
taken by the United States during the Chicken war, when he
describes in one of his papers that, when he was a U.S. official
during the Chicken War the United States raised tariffs for
brandy, clearly directed to France by including a tariff heading
of “brandy of more than 9 dollars per gallon.”8 In this regard,
Hudec asks: “[w]hy would GATT permit governments to do indirectly (discrimination-by-product-distinction) what prohibits
them doing directly (origin specific discrimination)?”9
The most telling indication that his work in this area
remains an important reference is that some authors continue
to debate whether or not every new report from a WTO panel or
the Appellate Body comes closer or departs from this concept.10
It is also telling that his legacy in this respect went beyond the
like product concept and contributed to the discussion of other
aspects of trade law beyond GATT Article III, such as GATT
Article I, intellectual property or technical barriers to trade.11
Despite the importance and longevity of the like product
concept, I believe Hudec’s most important contribution of the
aim and effects doctrine is his introduction of the notion of the
application of economic concepts to the rule of law. I am sure
that if he were still with us, he would want to expand the applicability of this notion to every aspect of international trade.
I understand that this was not Professor Hudec’s only contribution to the substance of international trade law. For instance, Gary Horlick mentions that he is the “unacknowledged
father of the most important single concept in the WTO Subsi-

7. Robert Hudec, Like Product: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 105 (Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis eds., 2000).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Roessler Frieder, Beyond the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor
Robert E. Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of Products
under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 771-781 (2003).
11. See Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachmann, Robert Hudec and Domestic
Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 783
(2003); T.N. Srinivasan, Nondiscrimination in GATT/WTO: Was There Anything to Begin With and is There Anything Left, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 69
(2005).
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dies and Countervailing Measures Agreement—“specificity.”12
III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
In addition to pioneering economic concepts, Hudec was also the most active advocate of the GATT dispute settlement
procedure. He defended the balance between diplomacy and
rule of law created by both aspects of the system. In this regard, I want to highlight two key problems that he identified in
this transition from GATT to WTO, which remain valid today.
A. TRANSPARENCY
Hudec was critical of the current practice and made it clear
that “the GATT must first remove the excessive blanket of confidentiality that surrounds its law and its legal sources.”13 This
critic was directed towards the fact that GATT dispute settlement documents kept restricted for a long period of time. Thus,
Hudec proposed that, “instead of thinking about how to run
away from the unpleasant legal behavior caused by the public
attention, the WTO should think about how to manage it.”14
Hudec went as far as proposing allowing “anyone” to file
briefs before panels and the Appellate Body.15 Of course, WTO
Members have not gone that far, although transparency has
indeed increased substantially over the last years. So far, panels have held public hearings in fourteen disputes and the
Appellate Body in eight disputes. Currently, an open hearing
relating to an aircraft dispute between the United States and
the European Union is taking place before the Appellate Body.
WTO has also increased transparency by making public
most of the dispute settlement documents. The WTO website
shows many, if not most, of the communications between the
parties and the Dispute Settlement Body, as well as those between the parties, and panels, and the Appellate Body.16 Some
12. Jackson et. al., supra note 3, at 737.
11. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11–14 (1999)
[hereinafter New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 48.
16. The official WTO dispute settlement documents that may be consulted
by the public on the WTO official website, see Dispute Settlement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm, and on the WTO
dispute
database,
see
Find
Dispute
Documents,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_documents_e.htm,
inter alia: consultations requests, panel requests, establishment and constitu-
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WTO Members have also made strides to increase transparency
by making public submissions to Panels and Appellate Body.17
In fact, Hudec was quite supportive of the first Appellate Body
report, which authorized the filing of amicus curiae briefs.18
B. REMEDIES
Hudec recognized that countries had made good efforts toward increasing compliance and in fact, was “somewhat surprised by the extent of WTO government efforts to comply.”19
As far as I can tell, Hudec always tried to support his assertions by looking at the empirical data, in other words, he liked
numbers. I am sure that he will be “somewhat satisfied” to see
that today only 37% of disputes have reached the panel stage
and 19% have reached the Appellate Body stage.
There are two things which caught my attention while
reading his work. First is his view of the current scheme of
suspension “of equivalent effect” and the other is the value he
saw in what he called the ultimate “remedy,” i.e., “community
pressure.”
Regarding the first aspect, throughout his work, he looked
at the economic aspect of the suspension of benefits and concluded that the economic rationale of suspending benefits of
equivalent effect was actually a “fiction” because he believes
that the country imposing the remedy would not gain anything
by raising trade barriers and that the “act usually inflicts a net
loss upon its own citizens even though most of its citizens are
not aware of that.”20 Moreover, he identified the forwardtion of panels, most communications from the chairperson of panels to the parties, preliminary rulings and final reports. There are other documents that are
by nature confidential such as the series of slates of suggested panellists that
are sent by the WTO Secretariat to the parties during the constitution of panels and, most importantly, the interim report. The Appellate Body, in turn,
also makes public the notices of appeal and other appeal, preliminary rulings,
and the Appellate Body reports.
17. Certain
independent,
private
websites,
such
as
www.worldtradelaw.net and www.tradelawguide.com, have also helped enhance transparency by providing analytical and thematic access to WTO dispute settlement documents.
18. See Hudec, supra note 14, at 47.
19. Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of
the World Trade Organization, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 211, 213 (2002).
20. Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT P ROCEDURES : ISSUE
& L ESSONS FROM THE P RACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL C OURTS &
T RIBUNALS 388 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).
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looking character of WTO remedies as a problem and criticized
the fact that “there is no compensation for the economic harms
done by the legal violation.”21
It is interesting that in one of his articles, Hudec mentions
a proposal submitted by developing countries during the Uruguay Round Negotiations seeking “monetary damages” as a
remedy for violations.22 It would be difficult to imagine that he
would have had any objection, not only because of his concerns
regarding the existing remedies, but also and most importantly, because he firmly believed in the rights of developing countries.23
Today, members have tabled proposals to improve remedies in the context of the DSU review negotiations. Some of the
proposals, including the one mentioned by Professor Hudec related to the right of a complaining party to seek monetary
damages for a WTO violation, seek to expand the scope of remedies.24
Finally, one can only acknowledge Professor Hudec’s insightfulness in looking at things from two angles. On one hand,
he criticizes this “equivalent effect”-standard of trade remedies,
but on the other hand, he recognized, referring to the GATT
21. Id. at 399.
22. Id. at 383.
23. Id.
24. See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations:
Communication from Kenya, TN/DS/W/42 (Jan. 24, 2003). For instance,
Kenya's proposal to amend Article 22.8 of the DSU to state: "[w]here injury
has resulted from the withdrawn measure, and if the developing or leastdeveloped country Member so requests, the DSB may recommend monetary
and any other appropriate compensation taking into account the nature of injury suffered." A similar proposal was submitted by Haiti and by the group of
least-developed countries. See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body,
Text for LDC Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations:
Communication from Haiti, TN/DS/W/37 (Jan. 22, 2003); Special Session of
the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by the LDC Group, TN/DS/W/17 (Oct. 9, 2002). Ecuador has
in turn proposed an amendment to Article 22.2 of the DSU, adding the following sentence: "[s]uch compensation may be partly or entirely monetary." See
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on Improvements
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by Ecuador, TN/DS/W/33 (Jan. 23, 2003). Mexico, for its part, has suggested that
Article 22.2 of the DSU be amended to read, in relevant part: "[c]ompensation
to developing country Members will be monetary unless otherwise agreed
(note 1)." See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Improvements
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/91 (Jul. 16, 2007).
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dispute settlement system, that the “ultimate” remedy was
something beyond a legal obligation, something he called
“community pressure.”
I am not able to nor in the position to characterize or to label the reasons why countries complied with WTO rulings. The
only thing I can do, as Professor Hudec did many times, is to
look at the empirical data. In particular, out of 418 disputes initiated only seventeen have received authorization from the
DSB to suspend benefits - that is, only 4%.
IV. THE APPELLATE BODY
Finally, we’ve come to the complicated part of my presentation: Professor Hudec’s take on the Appellate Body.
As many of you certainly are aware, Professor Hudec’s
romance with the Appellate Body can be divided into two parts.
As any good novel or soap opera, it started with hate and it
ended with love. The hate episode started with Professor Hudec’s strong opposition to the whole idea of creating an appellate tribunal.25 The first thing he questioned was the number of
obstacles to making high-quality legal decisions.26 As he points
out, good panel reports would be subject to mediocre appellate
proceedings.27
The other cause of opposition raised by Professor Hudec
was more a systemic one. As a firm believer of the current
GATT dispute settlement system, he had serious doubts regarding the transformation of the WTO system into a quasijudicial system.28 Hudec believed that the only way for this new
system to work was if governments were prepared to abide by it
and he had some doubts that this could actually happen.29
Alas, Professor Hudec had the opportunity of looking at no
more than twenty Appellate Body reports, but it is clear that
this was enough for him to become a believer of this institution.
Professor Hudec considered that the Appellate Body was “securely established and functioning well.”30
25. R. Hudec, The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, in T HE U RUGUAY R OUND AND B EYOND :
E SSAYS IN HONOR OF A RTHUR DUNKEL 116 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias
Hirsch eds., 1998).
26. Id. at 116-20
27. Id.
28. See New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 11–14
29. Id..
30. New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 33.
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In one article which may well be the best example of Professor Hudec’s honesty, leaving aside any consideration on
whether the Appellate Body agreed with his legal views, Professor Hudec stated that “the substance of the first dozen Appellate Body decisions rendered during the first three years has
been viewed by governments as competent, conservative and
‘responsible.’”31
In fact, he believed so much in this new institution that he
went beyond mere praise and proposed to eliminate the panel
stage and increase the Appellate Body membership to nine fulltime members.32 Another more practical proposal he made was
to increase the amount of time for the Appellate Body to issue
its decisions from sixty to ninety days.33 Due to the complexity
and size of the cases, the Appellate Body has regularly used the
ninety-day maximum in the DSU.34
Maybe what Professor Hudec anticipated was that as general familiarity with WTO rules and complexity of disputes
grow, so will the amount of claims and arguments made by participants. To give an example, the two disputes currently before
the Appellate Body involve panel reports of around 500 and
1,000 pages respectively.35
Finally, the major substantial change Professor Hudec
proposed was to grant the Appellate Body the power to remand
its findings to panels. Members have already identified this issue in the context of the DSU negotiations and have put forward proposals to address it.36
31. Id. at 31.
32. See id. at 33.
33. See id. at 31–32.
34. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 17.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (“In no case shall the
proceedings exceed 90 days.”).
35. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European
Communities and its Member States to the improvement and clarification of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/38 (Jan. 23, 2003)
(proposing to amend DSU Article 17.12 and add an Article 17bis), and
Dispute Settlement Body, Jordan’s Further Contribution Towards the Improvement and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DS/W/56 (May 19, 2003) (proposing to add an Article 17bis to account for
remand procedures).
36. See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009), and Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 2010).
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Overall, Hudec identified what in my view, are two of the
four pillars on which the Appellate Body stands. After my still
short residence in the Appellate Body, I am convinced that the
institutional four pillars are integration, collegiality, Members’
trust, and the quality of its support staff.
As to integration, I think the Appellate Body attributes
should be measured in terms equivalent to the ample experience of its members. The seven Members come from different
professional, academic, and cultural backgrounds. This gives
the Appellate Body great force in looking at every issue from
very different angles
This integration is only strengthened by the rule on collegiality, whereby the Division hearing the case will exchange
views with the other four members. Again, as Hudec would
have looked at it, out of seventy-eight reports, so far there have
only been two dissents and two concurring opinions.
The next aspect is one which Hudec identified as a prerequisite to the success or not of this new body and that is the
trust of the WTO Membership. The best empirical data on this
is my own experience, during my interview process with each
WTO Member. There it became clear to me the value and support the membership has in this institution.
Last, but not least, another pillar identified by Professor
Hudec was the need for the Appellate Body to be well-assisted
by the WTO. In this regard, we are quite fortunate to be supported by a group of eleven extraordinary lawyers, all of whom
greatly facilitate our task.
I am sure that, as he predicted, “a small army of academic
lawyers and well-published practicing lawyers [such as the
ones I see today] are already gathering around the Appellate
Body’s work product, with sharpened pencils in hand.”37 We
welcome that. The Appellate Body will not discuss its reports
but will always listen to the views, comments, and critiques of
others.
Certainly Professor Hudec’s voice will always be heard. As
I hope I could express to some extent here today, his legacy
should not be denied or forgotten. He “transcended the ostensible” and has become a vital reference to any “honest” international trade expert.38
37. New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 29.
38. Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on
the Nature of Litigation Between Governments 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 226
(1987).

